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CLD-303        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3235 
 ___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES AARON BROOKS, 
 
Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Criminal No. 2-95-cr-00564-001) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Harvey Bartle III 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P.  
 10.6 
September 29, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed:  October 14, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Charles Brooks is a federal prisoner, convicted in 1996 for his part in a series of 
armed bank robberies.  In April 2011, Brooks filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) motion for 
the return of property that, he argues, was unlawfully seized in 1995 by government 
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agents—specifically, the “Ten Squad” unit—prior to his indictment on the present 
charges.  His motion, while difficult to parse, appears to claim that the Ten Squad entered 
three properties at which he resided and took currency, jewelry, clothing, and other items, 
which they used to compel parties in his case to testify against one another.  Brooks avers 
that proper records were not kept of this activity, and that he only discovered that his 
property had been taken in April 2011, shortly before he filed his Rule 41(g) motion.  
Directed to respond by the District Court, the Government argued that Brooks’s motion 
was untimely.  The Court agreed, denying relief and rejecting Brooks’s ensuing request 
for reconsideration.  Brooks filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Gov’t of V.I. v. Edwards, 
903 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1990).  While “[i]n most Rule 41(g) cases demanding return 
of . . . property[] ‘we review the District Court’s decision to exercise its equitable 
jurisdiction for abuse of discretion,’” United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999)), the 
applicability of a statute of limitations is a legal question that we review de novo.  Syed 
v. Hercules, Inc., 214 F.3d 155, 159 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2008).  Having examined the record, we are in full 
accord with the District Court and will summarily affirm its orders.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 
No. 10-4397, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2279428, at *1 (3d Cir. June 10, 2011); see also 
Third Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Even under the District Court’s generous reading of 
the six-year limitations period, see Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 
2007), Brooks’s motion is untimely.  His argument that he only discovered the seizure in 
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2011 is unavailing; given the amount of property taken and the intervening passage of 
time, he “cannot argue with a straight face that it took him more than six years to find out 
that his property had been” seized.  United States v. Duke, 229 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 
2000); see also United States v. Wright, 361 F.3d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing 
awareness of Government action in the context of forfeiture).  Brooks repeatedly refers to 
an “Attachment A” to support his claim of recent discovery, but no such attachment 
appears to accompany any of his submissions.  Because the District Court correctly 
deemed the motion to be untimely, it did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reconsider 
its ruling.  United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Finally, if Brooks wishes to attack his conviction or sentence—and he appears to 
challenge evidence allegedly withheld by the prosecution in his case—he must proceed 
via 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997).  To the 
extent that it requests independent relief, Brooks’s “Motion to Clearify [sic]” is denied.  
 
